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How Not to Process Stateless
Enemies: A Review of Andrew
McCarthy’s Willful Blindness: A
Memoir of the Jihad
Timothy P. Connors*
Over eight years after the September 11th attacks, Al
Qaeda remains a viable enemy intent on attacking the United
States. As the Obama Administration’s Director of National
Intelligence, Admiral Dennis C. Blair, testified before the
Senate in February 2009,
Under the strategic direction of Usama Bin
Ladin and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, alQa’ida remains intent on attacking US interests
worldwide, including the US Homeland. . . . AlQa’ida leaders still use the [Pakistan] tribal
areas as a base from which they can avoid
capture, produce propaganda, communicate with
operational cells abroad, and provide training
and indoctrination to new terrorist operatives.1
Admiral Blair and others have characterized al Qaeda as a
stateless enemy, which consists of loosely affiliated networks,
operates from remote areas, and achieves global reach through
the tools of the Information Age.2 It is a threat that is unique
to the 21st century, and therefore does not fit neatly into the
systems we have constructed to deal with the threats of the last

* Timothy Connors is a partner at PJ Sage, Inc., a security firm that
advises clients on 21st century threats. He is a graduate of Notre Dame Law
School and a member of the New York State Bar.
1. S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 111TH CONG., ANNUAL THREAT
ASSESSMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 6 (Feb. 12, 2009) (statement for
the
record
of
Admiral
Dennis
C.
Blair),
available
at
http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20090212_testimony.pdf.
2. See, e.g., id. at 38-41.
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century (e.g., the Geneva Conventions and the U.S. criminal
justice system). What, for example, do we do with individual
members of al Qaeda who we detain on a global battlefield?
Each of the models built in the 20th century—criminal trials
and military tribunals—has its share of deficiencies, which are
evident in the raucous political discourse surrounding
Guantanamo Bay.
That debate has become even more heated, as the Obama
Administration moved to bring 9-11 mastermind Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed (“KSM”) to New York City for trial.3 In
announcing the decision, Attorney General Eric Holder cited a
need to bring Guantanamo detainees to justice and expressed
confidence in the U.S. criminal justice system’s ability to
handle these trials.4 New York Congressman Jerrold Nadler
echoed this reasoning, calling “[a]ny suggestion that our
prosecutors and our law enforcement personnel are not up to
the task of safely holding and successfully prosecuting
terrorists on American soil . . . insulting and untrue.”5 If only
the issues surrounding this decision were that simple. In fact,
it is a testament to the complexity of the problem that the
Administration also decided to both use military tribunals in
some cases and to detain enemy combatants indefinitely.6 And
despite continuing these long-held policy decisions of the Bush
Administration, as well as disparaging that Administration’s
policies for many years, the Attorney General was unable to
articulate with confidence what some of the second and third
order implications of the KSM decision would be.7
Holder’s decision, and apparent unwillingness to consider
the downside of that decision, should come as no surprise from
an Administration that has expressed a near absolute
3. Charlie Savage, U.S. to try Avowed 9/11 Mastermind Before Civilian
Court in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at A1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Posting of Frank James to The Two Way: NPR’s News Blog, Would
U.S.
Need
To
Read
Bin
Laden
His
Miranda
Rights?,
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2009/11/would_us_need_to_read_
bin_lade.html (Nov. 18, 2009 14:26 EST) (describing Senator Lindsey
Graham’s questioning of the Attorney General during Congressional hearings
regarding his decision to try KSM in New York).
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preference for criminal trials of terrorists in civilian courts. In
a speech on national security delivered last May, President
Obama clearly expressed such policy guidance. While it is
inconclusive how he might handle future detainees, President
Obama indicated a strong preference for using our federal
criminal justice system as the primary option:
First, whenever feasible, we will try those who
have violated American criminal laws in federal
courts—courts provided for by the United States
Constitution. Some have derided our federal
courts as incapable of handling the trials of
terrorists. They are wrong. Our courts and our
juries, our citizens, are tough enough to convict
terrorists.8
Andrew McCarthy disagrees with the President’s assertion
in his book Willful Blindness: A Memoir of the Jihad,9 which
describes McCarthy’s experience prosecuting the terrorists
behind the Landmarks Plot.10 He bears listening to, as there
are few prosecutors with the same extensive experience, which
he has earned while in the arena of a courtroom prosecuting
hardened terrorists. McCarthy pulls no punches in criticizing
the practice of treating “alien security threats as if they were
legal issues to be spotted and adjudicated rather than enemies
to be smoked out and defeated before they can kill.”11 In
making his case, McCarthy exhibits a healthy disrespect for
the use of courts and lawyers as the best instruments for
resolving all of life’s problems.
The terrorists he confronted certainly hardened his
convictions as to the best way for dealing with them. The Blind
8. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National
Security,
(May
21,
2009),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-OnNational-Security-5-21-09/.
9. ANDREW MCCARTHY, WILLFUL BLINDNESS: A MEMOIR OF THE JIHAD
(2008).
10. See id. at 231-44, 255-64 (describing the planning and investigation
of the Landmarks Plot, a failed terrorist attack on landmarks across New
York City).
11. Id. at 12.
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Sheikh, Omar Adbel Rahman, was the spiritual leader of the
cell responsible for the Landmarks Plot.12 Originally from
Egypt, he was educated at al-Azhar University in Cairo, where
he earned a doctorate in Qur’anic studies.13 He was a true
believer and crafty promoter of the ideology behind al Qaeda:
“Freedom” from what holds Muslims back can only be achieved
through submission to Allah and his religion, and Muslims
have an individual duty to impose Islam through violent
jihad.14
The Blind Sheikh gathered a following of foot soldiers and
more able jihadists in New York City circa 1990.15 Inspired by
Rahman, and plugged into a nascent global network spawned
in Afghanistan, this cell turned its attention toward attacking
the “head of the snake” in the United States.16 In 1993, they
successfully detonated a truck bomb in the parking garage at
the World Trade Center.17
This event was entirely
preventable, but for the risk averse culture in the FBI, which
had parted ways with Emad Salem, an informant inside the
cell, a few months before the attack.18 What is more, after
arresting and convicting Sayyid Nosair, a leading member of
the cell, for the 1990 murder of Meir Kahane in New York City,
the FBI seized a treasure trove of evidence it did nothing to
exploit.19
Ultimately, the cell survived the trials for the murder of
Kahane and the 1993 bombing, and it continued to plot grand
plans of attacking multiple New York landmarks. This time,
the FBI and the prosecutors were able to prevent an attack and
put the offenders behind bars.20 While this was certainly a
triumph of the American criminal justice system (something
the President and all Americans are rightfully proud of), the
arduous, drawn-out process carried with it many negative
implications. First and foremost, the system was strained to
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 231-44.
Id. at 241.
Id. at 36-37.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 189.
Id. at 169-75.
Id. at 130-33.
Id. at 294.
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the maximum in dealing with approximately one dozen
members of this one cell in New York. As McCarthy points out,
[e]ven with the highest conceivable conviction
rate of 100 percent, less than three dozen
terrorists were neutralized [during the eight
years between the bombing and the destruction
of the Twin Towers]—at a cost that was
staggering and that continues to be paid, as
several of these cases remain, all these years
later, in appellate or habeas-corpus litigation.21
The limitation signaled in these results is not comforting given
the global scope of al Qaeda and its allies.
Another negative aspect of the system according to
McCarthy is that it is risk averse.
Not only did law
enforcement investigators dismiss a valuable confidential
informant before the 1993 bombings and ignore evidence from
the Nosair case, truth be told, the FBI was monitoring this cell
in the late 1980s.22 Yet, when the budding jihadists discovered
that the FBI was conducting surveillance on them as they
trained with automatic weapons, they raised a claim of
religious persecution.23 It was enough to cause the FBI,
concerned with accusations that it was violating a person’s civil
rights, to end the surveillance.24
To be sure, law enforcement is not the only risk averse
element of the criminal justice system. Judges, afraid of
reversals, tend to deliver rulings that they are confident will
not be overturned.25 For example, when ruling on discovery
motions, judges naturally tend to favor disclosure of
information to the defense.26 Prosecutors also tend to disclose
more materials to defense attorneys than is required in order
to avoid reversal and retrial in the future.27 The reams of
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 310 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 87.
Id. at 89-90.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 311.
Id.
Id. at 310-11.
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information that become public during the course of a terrorism
trial should give pause for concern. McCarthy points out, for
example, that Ali Mohammed, an associate of Osama bin
Laden, obtained a list of names of about 200 unindicted coconspirators of the Landmarks Plot case and faxed it to bin
Laden in Sudan.28 Not only can our own intelligence sources
and methods be compromised during the disclosure process in a
criminal trial, but those of our allies as well. This presents a
serious obstacle to the international information sharing that
helps keep Americans safe at home.29
The choice between proceeding with a prosecution and
revealing state secrets in a criminal trial is a difficult one.
McCarthy finds it troubling to cede such choices on a wholesale
basis to lawyers and judges, as opposed to executive branch
officials charged with keeping the public safe from harm.30
Sometimes, [the criminal justice process is] an
illusion. Sometimes there is a bigger picture
that is obscured. The legal system’s job is not to
produce the definitive version of history. It is to
produce a judgment about the provenance of
facts the government chooses to put in dispute by
leveling accusations.31
As such, the criminal justice system is limited in scope in a way
that often makes it deficient in fighting terrorism.
Criminal process, organizational cultures, and intelligence
disclosures aside, perhaps what McCarthy finds the most
troubling is that, in his view, the jihadists he prosecuted were
emboldened by the process. There was a sense that the
American criminal justice system was feckless, which
encouraged many terrorists to believe that Allah favored their
endeavors with His protection. For example, McCarthy cites
the joyous courtroom celebration when a jury acquitted Sayyid
Nosair of Kahane’s murder.
In a war, it borders on

28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 305.
Id. at 312-13.
Id. at 311.
Id. at 23.
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recklessness to embolden one’s enemies.
Yet, McCarthy
argues, even in a successful trial where a conviction is achieved
and sustained, that is exactly what occurs.32
McCarthy also spares no punches for the radical belief
system that he sees as a robust minority within Islam. He
argues, “Islam is a dangerous creed. It rejects core aspects of
Western liberalism: self-determination, freedom of choice,
freedom of conscience, equality under the law.”33 He cites
numerous examples where Islamic authorities promote views
that are hateful and run counter to establishing peaceful
relations with non-Muslims.34 He also rails against Western
apologists who are blinded to, or rationalize away, these
realities.35 He argues that “[i]t is simply delusional to think
that there is no correlation between what a person believes and
how he is likely to act—as delusional as it is to think there is
no correlation between Islam’s doctrinal summons to violence
and Islamic terrorism.”36
This second part of McCarthy’s thesis in Willful Blindness
fails to address the tension policymakers face between rejecting
ideas that encourage violence and not being perceived by the
broader mass of Muslims as attacking their religion. There are
good reasons for policymakers to be cautious when talking
about religious concepts, reasons which do not necessarily
make them apologists. The ultimate objective should be to
isolate the extremists (whether that is a mere handful or, as
McCarthy argues, a much larger minority) within their own
religion. That is a heavy, and perhaps impossible, lift for a
Western policymaker. Rather, it may be wiser to follow
General David Petraeus’ rule in fighting the counterinsurgency
32. Id. at 154-56. Although Nosair was acquitted on the murder charge,
he was convicted on charges of gun possession, assault, and coercion. The
trial judge believed that the jury’s decision to acquit Nosair of murder “was
against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and was devoid of common
sense and logic,” and he ultimately sentenced Nosair to the maximum term
for each conviction. Ronald Sullivan, Judge Gives Maximum Term in Kahane
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1992, at A1 (quoting New York State Supreme
Court Justice Alvin Schlesinger).
33. MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at 316.
34. Id. at 316-17.
35. See, e.g., id. at 28-34 (McCarthy’s rebuttal of terrorism expert Dr.
Marc Sageman).
36. Id. at 178.
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in Iraq: Do no harm.37
McCarthy comes to his conclusions about Islam honestly.
During the trial, he saw many Muslim witnesses demure to the
Blind Sheikh when matters of religious doctrine were
introduced. According to McCarthy,
[t]his made not a bit of difference to the trial—
Abdel Rahman had incontestably called for
brutal strikes so many times that it was
irrelevant whether these apparently nice people
had gotten the word.
What was jarring,
however, was that they were nice people and yet
they were ready to defer, on matters of
importance in their faith, to the homicidal
maniac sitting in the corner of our courtroom.38
In the grand scheme, it is worth remembering that keeping
those nice people nice may often dictate how, or whether,
government officials confront the rhetoric of the Blind Sheikhs
of the world—perhaps a hard reality to accept for a battlescarred prosecutor.
Willful Blindness is a well-written and entertaining
criticism of the criminal justice model of fighting a global
terrorist organization. As we continue to debate policy on
Guantanamo detainees, we should be mindful of how we deal
with other 21st century threats. For example, on our southern
border, a future conflict with drug cartels is brewing. These
stateless actors do not shy away from extreme violence, and it
is not inconceivable that the problems that they will create will
grow beyond the managing capacity of our criminal justice
system. In considering how we will deal with the al Qaedas of
the world, policymakers will do well to consider the lessons
that McCarthy learned. He was there at the beginning.

37. See, e.g., Cullen Nutt, Opinion, Petraeus’ “Big Tent”, STAR LEDGER,
Mar. 2, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 4162911 (WestLaw).
38. MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at 316.
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